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Abstract. File sharing networks are among the most popular applica-
tions of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) technology to date [3] and have been widely
studied in terms of the performance, behavior, topology and other prop-
erties. A persistent theme throughout this research has been the evidence
that many P2P file sharing systems rely on the presence of altruistic
users, who provide files, network capacity or some other goods without
obvious personal gain to work and are potentially damaged by the pres-
ence of too many free-riders (users who consume resources but do not
provide to others in return). In this paper we will explore the use of
simple market mechanisms for P2P file sharing which function without
the need of altruistic users considering the conditions under which such
markets may be viable.
1 Introduction
Many P2P file sharing systems are known to rely heavily on the presence of
altruistic users which act as sources for content which benefits others but not
necessarily themselves [11]1. But experiences with P2P file sharing systems con-
firms that large resources owners are not always altruistic [2]. Economic mar-
ket based systems have been proposed and in some trial systems adopted [4],
widely as a regulatory mechanism to provide incentives for users to provide
content/resources to a system rather than relying on the altruism to others.
Systems such as Karma [7] and MojoNation2 are well known for introducing
“virtual currency” based markets in order to facilitate exchange. Systems based
on reputation [16], ranking [8], or other means have also been suggested.
1 In some P2P system a non–negligible percentage of peers were proven to be altruistic.
In Gnutella for example, 1% of peers served about 37 % of the total file shared [1].
2 MojoNation has ceased operations, although information is still online:
web.archive.org/web/*/mojonation.net/*.
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Much of the analysis of such systems ([9], [13]) however have focused on free
riders – actors who take more than their fair share of the benefits or do not
shoulder their fair share of the costs of their use of a resource – and how to
eradicate them. The danger of the presence of too many free-riders will reduce
or force to zero the number of altruists in the population – thus stopping a
system from functioning. In this context an additional question arises: can a
market-based system for P2P file exchange function at all without the presence
of altruistic agents? and if so what conditions are necessary for it to function?
It seems intuitive that the answer to the first question should be yes since digital
content can arguably been seen as a good like any other. However, as it is argued
in this paper there are a number of pitfalls in implementing a functioning market
system and have been studied the conditions under which a file exchange market
mechanism based on a “virtual currency” such as those tried in Karma and
MojoNation can facilitate viable file-exchange. In general, P2P systems have
two ways to encourage users to contribute to a community:
– By making users believe the idea that they are part of the community and
stimulating their altruism toward the system.
– Providing a model by means of norms or rules that stimulates the users to
contribute by providing a direct reward for contributions – in other words
offering a return for contributions.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. Sec-
tion 3 characterizes different types of markets. In section 4 are analyzed exper-
imental results for different market configurations. Finally section 5 provides
conclusions and outlook.
2 Token based markets for P2P file sharing environments
File–sharing applications provide the interchanges of content between users.
Specifically, users typically have in their possession a certain amount of con-
tent but they would like to obtain other files they currently do not possess.
Other users, in turn may wish to access the content a user may have. In an
ideal world, a user would like to obtain all the content of interest to him/herself
without incurring any infrastructure costs (note that in certain systems costs
for content itself may apply - these are not considered here). Other members of
the community however have a similar aim and given that there are inevitably
some infrastructure costs incurred from providing content files to others, such as
bandwidth, continual connectivity etc. the question arises as how should these
costs be shared between participants?
Given the assumption that no agent in the world is willing to altruistically
incur costs simply in support of the community, as in human economic systems,
a balance therefore needs to be struck between a member of the community
providing content and their ability to download content. A powerful mechanism
to achieve this is the use of a concrete means of transferable value which can be
earned by providing content and spent by downloading it.
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2.1 Model description
This section introduces a simple and generic market model for file interchange
based on a synthetic currency (tokens) which act like a means of transferable
value. Elements present in the system, are: the agents which participate, denoted
by A = {a1, . . . , ar}, a set of files F = {f1, . . . , fs} and a set of categories each
of which groups a set of files by similar theme C = {c1, . . . , ct}. In any given
scenario, the three main elements for the description of model are: the initial and
targeted distribution of content, the monetary system and, finally, the behavior
of the members. With respect to monetary system, the financial exchange rules
imposed on members of the system by the system and agent behavior strategies
for purchase/sale of content and interaction with other agents, a system can
be controlled according to two dimensions: 1) manipulation of market rules in
order to increase/optimize exchange efficiency between agents (defined in point
Monetary system) and 2) manipulation of individual agent strategies in the world
such as trigger rules for when Agents do/do not make content available, defined
in point Agent behavior.
Content distribution: In order to simulate content exchange, we model a
random initial distribution of content in the system [15]:
– To each category, the model assigns a popularity ranking, using a Zipf3
probability distribution:
p(c) =
1
c∑t
i=0
1
i
where t is the number of categories.
– Each agent in the system has a minimum number of categories with which
it is associated and an interest level in each category (c′ ∈ Ci) is assigned to
them w.r.t. il is determined for each agent following a random distribution.
Finally, an agent i that has an interest level il in each category c, is denoted
by p(c|i), that is drawn from a Zipf probability distribution s.t.:
p(c|i) = il
i
c∑
c′∈Ci il
i
c′
– Each category has an assigned number of files p(c)F , where p(c) is the frac-
tion of files in the category c and F the total number of files in the system.
– Each agent has assigned a quantity of files fc,r, where c represents the cat-
egory and r the ranking of popularity of the file. For initial conditions, the
system follows a uniformly random distribution, which assigns only files of
categories where the agent has interest. With respect to the popularity of
the new content, will also follow a Zipf probability distribution.
3 It has been observed in [10] that many document storage systems exhibit Zipf dis-
tribution on the popularity of his documents.
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– Finally, the system assigns popularity to each file within a category, given
by the Zipf probability distribution:
p(fc,r|c) =
1
r∑Fc
i=0
1
i
where Fc is the number of different files in the category c.
These assignments, categories etc. form the basis for driving desire for content
and later satisfaction generated by possession of content in the system (depicted
in figure ).
ar
ilc1
ilcj
c1
a1
cj
ct
f1
fb
fb+1
fc
fs
a:agent
il: interest level
c: category
f: file
Fig. 1. Content distribution
Monetary system: A monetary system secures the proper functioning of
money by regulating economic agents, transaction types, and money supply.
In the model, we have agents which wish to obtain files from the market. 4 Two
types of transactions are possible in the system. The first one is to obtain some
content; the other is to supply some content. The first agents will have average
value of all cost per file. New members only arrange a minimum quantity of
tokens to buy new set of files, so it forces them to offer its contents. Also, files
are assigned when starting the system in a proportional way i.e. if the system
has n files per category and a category has m agents, the agent of this category
will has n/m files.
The model is composed by two markets. The inner market models the mech-
anisms created in order to facilitate interchange of files. This inner market is
embedded in an outer market which represents the real world in which users
live/work and it is seen as a proxy for their individual satisfaction. The two
markets are set up to use two separate currencies: in the inner market agents
have IMT (inner-market-tokens) which represents the virtual currency as might
be used in a system such as MojoNation and the outer market transactions are
4 In the model presented here, the notion of satisfaction B is used as quality measure
which reflects how user’s content is – increasing when desirable content is obtained,
decreasing when resources are used to serve files.
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made using OMT (outer-market-tokens) which represents a model of satisfac-
tion of the user either in abstract terms or (for example) in terms of a real world
currency such as US dollars, Euros or Japanese Yen. The reason for using two
currencies in the model is in fact to capture the use of just virtual one. The OMT
models a real world currency such as the Dollar or the Euro – and the second
currency, the virtual one being studied; it is created specifically for the applica-
tion in question. When a consumer agent wishes to purchase content, they pay
using IMT and the provider agent receives these tokens which it can barter in
the future. In terms of OMT, the provider has a cost to offer the content and
the consumer got a quantity of OMT5 (it is depicted in figure 2). If an agent
in the system has less IMT than necessary for a particular piece of content, a
purchase cannot be made and OMT will not be improved.
cost in OMT IMT
Outer Market
Inner Market
ai ai aj aj
obtain
satisfaction
In this transaction agent i supplies a content to agent j and it presents the currency
flow between the agents/markets
Fig. 2. Interaction between the two markets
Although real currencies could also be used in the file–sharing market (in
place of IMT) this is generally not an attractive solution since real financial
transactions generally incur real transactions costs and raise taxation issues.
Agent behavior: In order to describe agent behavior, in first place we establish
a set of basic rules:
– Rule 1: An agent ab will never buy a file f , if ab is already its owner.
– Rule 2: If something costs more tokens than an agent ab has, ab cannot buy
it.
– Rule 36: If an agent ab has enough tokens or it is not interested in any
content, ab will not offer its content.
All agents in the system have an associated quantity of IMT Qimt – in the
inner file market and a quantity of OMT Qomt – in the outer general market.
The objective O for all agents is maximum satisfaction B.
5 In terms of satisfaction, agents in the system aim to maximize OMT since this value
represents the satisfaction attained by agents in the system.
6 This relevant rule, relates agent behavior and the market. The main objective for all
agents is to gain maximum satisfaction and not to obtain a large quantity of tokens.
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∀i∈system O(ai) = max B
z represents a quantity of files that an individual might desire (i.e. files that
an agent has some interest). B(z) is the utility (satisfaction) gained by that
individual obtaining this quantity z.
B(z) =
∑b
i=0 B(fi)
We model an individual’s choice of z by assuming the consumer chooses z
to maximize B(z) and not by other human social instincts. This means that the
agents in the model are focused on obtaining the maximum number of files that
they desire rather than anything else.
z0 = argmaxz B(z)
holds if and only if z0 is the unique value of z for which B(z) is maximized.
Download of the desired contents is not free however, since there is some cost
associated with provision of content by the potential provider agent. A content
provider may then levy a fee for the content in terms of OMT, an agent seeking
content must itself seek to obtain IMT if it does not already have them, creating
an economic cycle. This cycle means that when paying for content, we describe
O as:
O(ai) = max(α z0 - β QOMT )
Once we have a clear idea about the objective followed by community members
we should describe how these members can achieve it by means of their strategies.
The strategy Si of agent i is formed by a set of actions that it can follow in each
step, trying to achieve agent’s O. The available actions AC in the system are:
ACs Agents choose to offer or withdraw from offer content to/from the system
(and for each download will incur a fixed cost in real world resources in IMT
and gain a fixed sum of OMT).
ACd Agents choose to download / not download available content, in the case of
each download using up OMT but generating increased satisfaction measure
by their desire for the file - converted into a monetary value in terms of IMT.
With respect to outer market, agents desire to spend minimum quantity of OMT
and to achieve the maximum possible satisfaction which would correspond to
obtaining all the files in the categories associated with the Agent7. With respect
to the inner market, agents only offer content if they are interested in a content
and they do not have enough IMT to buy it.
3 Types of Market Scenario
A market mechanism provides a powerful mechanism to regulate exchange be-
tween members of a community, in which each one of the members of the com-
munity wishes to maximize its utility [14]. A natural step is to create market
7 In the model, 1 unit OMT is equal at 1 unit of satisfaction.
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places which use a type of artificial currency in order to simulate transferable
value between users in a system – and hence facilitate exchange. As it is shown
in this section however, there are pitfalls to doing this. In particular the types of
markets envisaged include: Time limited markets, content limited markets, and
time and content unlimited markets. The model for file interchange , described
in [6], has three main elements that specify our system are content distribution,
monetary system, and agent behavior. The most relevant aspects to look on as
is that the model are:
– The model is composed by two markets. The inner market model used to
study the application and the outer market model which models a real world
currency.
– Agents select its strategy (offer/download content) conditioned to the quan-
tity of tokens that they have/have not (thresholds).
3.1 Time limited markets
In this case, the number of interactions in a given market place is limited (time
limited). Concretely, this means that in a time the system will cease functioning
(for example if all files are exchanged, a certain deadline passes or after some
signal is given). In a time unlimited market, members cooperate with the ob-
jective of getting a benefit in a long term future8. However, when the time is
limited, the hope of a future benefit is not apparent because members know that
in a concrete time the game will finish.
To comprehend the effect of this given that players know that a game has
exactly n rounds. Then, no matter which round has been reached (say n−1) the
agent is aware that the currency used in the inner market will no longer be useful
after the end of the game. Hence no agent will offer content in the last round
(round n). Subsequently this also means that the currency is no use not only
after the end of the game but also not in the last round. Similarly no agent will
offer content in round n-1 and so forth. By repeating this argument many times,
rational agents would deduce that they should not offer content at all (unless
their motivation changes because someone else offers something they want). In a
simulation where an agent can chose between two strategies, the only difference
between the two strategies (s1,s2) and (s′1,s2) is that in the period t the first
strategy chooses C (cooperate – offer content) and the second strategy chooses
D (defect – not offer content). Until the end T of all iterations the benefits of
choosing the strategy (s′1,s2) will be greater than (s1,s2). This concept is clearly
analogous in the well known game theory known as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
[5] result for games of known duration. 9 The conflict between the individual and
collective interests is expressed in this game, which has implications in real life
in areas like the policy, society, economy. Concretely the relation is with a subset
of PD, named PD with finite repetitions.
8 The shadow of the future [5].
9 PD rules are explained in detail in [12].
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3.2 Content limited markets
This hypothesis considers that the content is limited even if time were unlimited.
In such world the number of total different content items is finite and unchanging.
In an ideal world all members in the market should obtain all contents that they
want. If agents are aware of this fact, this goal will not be achieved. When an
agent obtains all the content that it desires (satisfied agent) it is conscious of
the fact that it has all it may want so a rational agent would cease offering
content. The reason is similar to that in the previous case: the agent will, in the
future, not derive benefit from the inner–market tokens (IMT) obtained. This
fact entails that other non-satisfied agents may not obtain all the content they
desire if some of it is held by satisfied agents. The tokens have value for an agent
if they can be exchanged for something desirable. Once it is known that there
is no more new content to obtain, the value of tokens tends to zero. In turn,
this causes the agent to become resistant to offering content before all possible
useful exchange have been made. Only altruists would continue once they had
obtained everything they needed.
3.3 Time and content limited markets
Under these restrictions, a market has little hope of functioning. An interesting
example of this can be seen in exemplify by Clive Thompson in his article “Not
With a Bang but a Whimper” about the game Asheron’s Call 2 10, an online
game scheduled to cease functioning in December 2005. Characters in the game
may pick up items such as tools, armor and weapons at once within a container
and they can trade these items with other players. When the game was flowering
the characters used to sell their items but when the game shut down was first
announced, the majority of players left the game. This happens because with-
out a sense of future capitalism ends. In other words there’s no demand in a
condemned world.
3.4 Time and content unlimited markets
In the previous section it was argued analytically that markets limited in time
or/and content function sub–optimally, if at all. In this section, we move on to
the case of behavior of the market without these limitations. With respect to the
cost of offering a piece of content versus the satisfaction that someone can obtain
from obtaining outer–market tokens (OMT), we have the following alternatives:
A. If the cost of offering is less than the benefit obtained: In this case, agents
have interest in offering their contents because they can obtain benefit of it
in return – a benefit that in the future the agent can re–invest.
B. If the cost of offering is equal to the benefit obtained: In this case, no net
benefit is generated through offering content on average.
10 http://ac2.turbine.com/
Studying viable free markets in P2P 9
C. If the cost of offering is greater than the benefit obtained: In this case file
exchange generates a net loss for the community over time and most likely
for the individual – increasing with the number of transactions carried out.
For the three options above it is probable that A and B could function in
some form (although option B only in a very limited manner), while option C
appears to be unsustainable in the long run since agents in the system will all
incrementally loose satisfaction.
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we describe a number of simulations which help to clarify the
nature of the dynamics of a token–based P2P market under the scenarios listed
in the previous section – Time and content unlimited markets.
Symbol Meaning Value
A n of agents 200
F n of files 200
C n of categories 5
CxA n of categories x agents 2
Cimtfx Cost per file (IMT) 500
Bimtfx Benefit per file (IMT) 500
Comtfx Cost per file (OMT) Minimum Bomtfx
Bomtfx Benefit per file (OMT) Greater than Comtfx
Table 1. Initial experiment parameters
Agents in the system11 do not act altruistically12 and this is concretely inter-
preted as a fixed rule: agents only offer content to generate IMT up to a set limit
(threshold) which is the level the agent expects to be able to usefully spend on
new content. Further, since an agent cannot buy content if it has less IMT. By
means of these thresholds, the period where agents offer content is constrained
by need. When an agent has more IMT than threshold related with the supply,
no content is offered. Further, since an agent cannot buy content if it has less
IMT a simple layered model emerges as shows in figure 3.
4.1 Experimental results
In this section we analyze the results of experiments simulating options 2 and 4
above. Different cases considered for option 2 are:
11 Table 1 describes the system settings.
12 However when the system starts to work in the initial state some agents are randomly
selected and forced to offer their contents. Without this jump start, no agents would
offer content intially.
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Fig. 3. Boundaries related with IMT
Simulation 1: At this case agents have a quantity of 2900 IMT, near to thresh-
old related with the supply.
Simulation 2: At this case 2000 IMT per agent.
Simulation 3: At this case 600 IMT per agent, near to threshold related with
the demand.
In option 4, three cases are considered:
Simulation 4: Half of the members 600 IMT and the other half 2000 IMT.
Simulation 5: Half of the members 200 IMT and the other half 2000 IMT.
Simulation 6: Half of the members 200 IMT and the other half 6000 IMT.
Figures 4 a) and 4 b) show the cdf of the different scenarios proposed above, in
terms of quantity of files exchanged in the system and times that agents did not
have enough tokens to buy contents when they would have liked to (indicating
inefficiency of the market as an exchange mechanism) respectively. The first
figure shows the relationship between quantity of tokens and number of files on
sale. The second figure relates the threshold and quantity of times an agent in
the system does not have enough IMT to buy content. Both figures show the
importance of the amount of tokens that the agents in the system runs.
4.2 Evaluation Results & Discussion
The simulations show the following results:
– The first observation is that at the beginning all simulations show a signifi-
cant increase of activity due to different facts: initially, agents have enough
money to buy at least one file; also we may think about many agents having
an interest in the content offered by the rest of members.
– Simulations 1, 2 and 3 reveal that the quantity of tokens in the system mod-
ifies the behavior of the market, in terms of global number of files exchanged
(at satisfaction level). Reviewing values shown in figures 4 a) and 4 b), in
a first glance it is shown that in simulations 2, 6 and specially 3, in many
cases agents wants to buy content but they do not have enough tokens to
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Fig. 4. a) Experimental results related with number of sold files x simulation b) Ex-
perimental results related with number of times that agents in the system does not
have enough tokens
buy anything, showing that it is not a optimum market. Reviewing in detail
different steps in the simulation 3, it can be seen that the distribution of
tokens is not appropriate to the right working of the system: Some agents
pass boundary related to supply, so they can’t offer anything; and others
agents do not have enough tokens to buy content.
– Simulation 4 shows that selfish agents can actually prevent the system from
working correctly. This occurs because; if an agent has more tokens than
threshold supply they will not offer their content. And, in this case, the
remaining agents have a number of tokens near to the threshold supply.
Hence once a few files have been purchased, they also pass this quantity and
cease offering files. This confirms the stability of market fails in the case of
token oversupply.
– In simulation 5, agents that have fewer tokens than the purchasing threshold
can trade to move above the threshold. Limited trade becomes stable in token
undersupply situations.
– In simulation 6, agents that have more tokens than the threshold supply
can trade with agents that have fewer tokens. A transferring of tokens is
generated from agents that have tokens to agents who have not tokens.
Throughout this paper we have discussed which market conditions which
are/are not viable for P2P file sharing systems. While the restrictions discussed
in this paper do not apply to all P2P systems they may certainly arise in systems.
Examples could include: 1) limited content a system of interchange of contents
could exist specialized. In particular movie categories, 2) limited time markets
in special short–term corporate promotions (where tokens loose validity after
a certain date) or 3) in time/content unlimited scenarios where the balance
between cost and benefit is very fine. The analysis and experiments show that:
– Markets finite in time or content are likely to fail (either because agents can
reason about the eventual collapse of the token currency, or because content
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is withdraw from sharing to early once some agents gather all the files they
are interest in).
– That even in markets with infinite time and content, where token based
economies can function, barriers still exist to fluid interchange even if the
cost/benefit of trading files is above zero.
– Money supply issues in infinite time and content markets play a large role
in success/failure (as implicitly does new content supply). This mirrors real
world inflation/deflation/money supply issues in a simple way which is un-
surprising. However, in such limited environments, effects are more dramatic
and further the existence of upper and lower bounds suggest that optimal
values may exist which would need to change over time with the amount of
users and content.
The first result suggests that artificial currencies would not be a good so-
lution for time/content limited scenarios and in these cases, despite the added
cost/complexity, real currency approaches may need to be used. The second two
statements suggest that even in cases where virtual currency approaches could
be applied, careful management of the currency in question needs to be car-
ried out – most likely regulating the money supply over time to ensure efficient
functioning.
5 Conclusion and Outlook
The results presented here provide a rough classification of types of token-based
markets. In order to understand these phenomena in detail however, more work
is needed in particular to: establish the range of conditions under which such
a phenomena arise, analyze the detailed dynamics of those cases under which
the system works. However, the overall aim of further work would be to explore
money supply and market policy issues in order to manage the economy of the
inner market to keep it in the identified functional zone. Each of the model
changes considered above would likely change the visible market dynamics but
the underlying results of a relatively narrow set of market conditions being viable
seems likely to be stable.
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